The Right to Keep and Bear Arms

REPORT

of the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

of the

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

Second Session

February 1982

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1982

88-618 0
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U. S. Government
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Washington, D.C. 20402

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL LAXALT, Nevada

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

ROBERT DOLE, Kansas

HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio

ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming

DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona

JOHN P. EAST, North Carolina

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama

HOWELL HEFLIN, Alabama

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

Vinton DeVane Lide, Chief Counsel

Quentin Crommelin, Jr., Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Counsel and Staff Director

Randall Rader, General Counsel

Peter E. Ornsby, Counsel

Robert Feidler, Minority Counsel

CONTENTS

____________

Preface, by Senator Orrin G. Hatch, chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, from the State of Utah

Preface by Senator Dennis DeConcini, ranking minority member, U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, from the State of
Arizona

History: Second amendment right to "keep and bear arms"

Appendix: Case law

Enforcement of Federal firearms laws from the perspective of the Second
Amendment

Other views of the second amendment:

Does the Second Amendment mean what it says?, by David J. Steinberg,
executive director, National Council for a Responsible Firearms policy.

National Coalition to ban handguns, statement on the Second Amendment, by
Michael K. Beard, executive director, and Samuel S. Fields, legal affairs
coordinator, National Coalition to Ban Handguns.

Historical Bases of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, by David T. Hardy,
partner in the Law Firm Sando & Hardy.

The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: The Intent
of the Framers, by Stephen P. Halbrook, PH. D., attorney and counselor at law.

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution Guarantees an
Individual Right To Keep and Bear Arms, by James J. Featherstone, Esq.,
General Counsel, Richard E. Gardiner, Esq., and Robert Dowlut, Esq., Office of
the General Counsel, National Rifle Association of America.

The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, by
John Levin, assistant professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology.

Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of The Second
Amendment, by Roy G. Weatherup, J.D., 1972 Standford University; member of the
California Bar.

Gun control legislation, by the Committee on Federal Legislation, the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

PREFACE

"To preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people
always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use
them." (Richard Henry Lee, Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress,
initiator of the Declaration of Independence, and member of the first Senate,
which passed the Bill of Rights.)

"The great object is that every man be armed . . . Everyone who is able
may have a gun." (Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Convention on the
ratification of the Constitution.)

"The advantage of being armed . . . the Americans possess over the
people of all other nations . . . Notwithstanding the military establishments
in the several Kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public
resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with
arms." (James Madison, author of the Bill of Rights, in his Federalist
Paper No. 46.)

"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed." (Second Amendment to the Constitution.)

In my studies as an attorney and as a United States Senator, I have
constantly been amazed by the indifference or even hostility shown the Second
Amendment by courts, legislatures, and commentators. James Madison would be
startled to hear that his recognition of a right to keep and bear arms, which
passed the House by a voice vote without objection and hardly a debate, has
since been construed in but a single, and most ambiguous Supreme Court decision,
whereas his proposals for freedom of religion, which he made reluctantly out of
fear that they would be rejected or narrowed beyond use, and those for freedom
of assembly, which passed only after a lengthy and bitter debate, are the
subject of scores of detailed and favorable decisions. Thomas Jefferson, who
kept a veritable armory of pistols, rifles and shotguns at Monticello, and
advised his nephew to forsake other sports in favor of hunting, would be
astounded to hear supposed civil libertarians claim firearm ownership should be
restricted. Samuel Adams, a handgun owner who pressed for an amendment stating
that the "Constitution shall never be construed . . . to prevent the people
of the United States who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own arms,"
would be shocked to hear that his native state today imposes a year's
sentence, without probation or parole, for carrying a firearm without a police
permit.

This is not to imply that courts have totally ignored the impact of the
Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights. No fewer than twenty-one decisions by
the courts of our states have recognized an individual right to keep and bear
arms, and a majority of these have not only recognized the right but invalidated
laws or regulations which abridged it. Yet in all too many instances, courts or
commentators have sought, for reasons only tangentially related to
constitutional history, to construe this right out of existence. They argue that
the Second Amendment's words "right of the people" mean "a right of the
state" — apparently overlooking the impact of those same words when used in
the First and Fourth Amendments. The "right of the people" to assemble or
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not contested as an
individual guarantee. Still they ignore consistency and claim that the right to
"bear arms" relates only to military uses. This not only violates a
consistent constitutional reading of "right of the people" but also ignores that
the second amendment protects a right to "keep" arms. These commentators
contend instead that the amendment's preamble regarding the necessity of a
"well regulated militia . . . to a free state" means that the right to keep
and bear arms applies only to a National Guard. Such a reading fails to note
that the Framers used the term "militia" to relate to every citizen
capable of bearing arms, and that the Congress has established the present
National Guard under its own power to raise armies, expressly stating that it
was not doing so under its power to organize and arm the militia.

When the first Congress convened for the purpose of drafting a Bill of
Rights, it delegated the task to James Madison. Madison did not write upon a
blank tablet. Instead, he obtained a pamphlet listing the State proposals for a
bill of rights and sought to produce a briefer version incorporating all the
vital proposals of these. His purpose was to incorporate, not distinguish by
technical changes, proposals such as that of the Pennsylvania minority, Sam
Adams, or the New Hampshire delegates. Madison proposed among other rights that
"That right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a
well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country;
but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to
render military service in person." I n the House, this was initially
modified so that the militia clause came before the proposal recognizing the
right. The proposals for the Bill of Rights were then trimmed in the interests
of brevity. The conscientious objector clause was removed following objections
by Elbridge Gerry, who complained that future Congresses might abuse the
exemption to excuse everyone from military service.

The proposal finally passed the House in its present form: "A well
regulated militia, being necessary for the preservation of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." In this
form it was submitted into the Senate, which passed it the following day. The
Senate in the process indicated its intent that the right be an individual one,
for private purposes, by rejecting an amendment which would have limited the
keeping and bearing of arms to bearing "For the common defense".

The earliest American constitutional commentators concurred in giving this
broad reading to the amendment. When St. George Tucker, later Chief Justice of
the Virginia Supreme Court, in 1803 published an edition of Blackstone annotated
to American law, he followed Blackstone's citation of the right of the subject
"of having arms suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are
allowed by law" with a citation to the Second Amendment, "And this
without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the
British government." William Rawle's "View of the Constitution" published in
Philadelphia in 1825 noted that under the Second Amendment: "The prohibition
is general. No clause in the Constitution could by a rule of construction be
conceived to give to Congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious
attempt could only be made under some general pretense by a state legislature.
But if in blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this
amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both." The Jefferson papers
in the Library of Congress show that both Tucker and Rawle were friends of, and
corresponded with, Thomas Jefferson. Their views are those of contemporaries of
Jefferson, Madison and others, and are entitled to special weight. A few years
later, Joseph Story in his "Commentaries on the
Constitution" considered the right to keep and bear arms as "the
palladium of the liberties of the republic", which deterred tyranny and
enabled the citizenry at large to overthrow it should it come to pass.

Subsequent legislation in the second Congress likewise supports the
interpretation of the Second Amendment that creates an individual right. In the
Militia Act of 1792, the second Congress defined "militia of the United
States" to include almost every free adult male in the United States. These
persons were obligated by law to possess a firearm and a minimum supply of
ammunition and military equipment. This statute, incidentally, remained in
effect into the early years of the present century as a legal requirement of gun
ownership for most of the population of the United States. There can by little
doubt from this that when the Congress and the people spoke of a "militia", they
had reference to the traditional concept of the entire populace capable of
bearing arms, and not to any formal group such as what is today called the
National Guard. The purpose was to create an armed citizenry, which the
political theorists at the time considered essential to ward off tyranny. From
this militia, appropriate measures might create a "well regulated militia" of
individuals trained in their duties and responsibilities as citizens and owners
of firearms.

If gun laws in fact worked, the sponsors of this type of legislation should
have no difficulty drawing upon long lists of examples of crime rates reduced by
such legislation. That they cannot do so after a century and a half of trying —
that they must sweep under the rug the southern attempts at gun control in the
1870-1910 period, the northeastern attempts in the 1920-1939 period, the
attempts at both Federal and State levels in 1965-1976 — establishes the
repeated, complete and inevitable failure of gun laws to control serious
crime.

Immediately upon assuming chairmanship of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, I sponsored the report which follows as an effort to study, rather
than ignore, the history of the controversy over the right to keep and bear
arms. Utilizing the research capabilities of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, the resources of the Library of Congress, and the assistance of
constitutional scholars such as Mary Kaaren Jolly, Steven Halbrook, and David T.
Hardy, the subcommittee has managed to uncover information on the right to keep
and bear arms which documents quite clearly its status as a major individual
right of American citizens. We did not guess at the purpose of the British 1689
Declaration of Rights; we located the Journals of the House of Commons and
private notes of the Declaration's sponsors, now dead for two centuries. We did
not make suppositions as to colonial interpretations of that Declaration's right
to keep arms; we examined colonial newspapers which discussed it. We did not
speculate as to the intent of the framers of the second amendment; we examined
James Madison's drafts for it, his handwritten outlines of speeches upon the
Bill of Rights, and discussions of the second amendment by early scholars who
were personal friends of Madison, Jefferson, and Washington while these still
lived. What the Subcommittee on the Constitution uncovered was clear — and long
lost — proof that the second amendment to our Constitution was intended as an
individual right of the American citizen to keep and carry arms in a peaceful
manner, for protection of himself, his family, and his freedoms. The summary of
our research and findings form the first portion of this report.

In the interest of fairness and the presentation of a complete picture, we
also invited groups which were likely to oppose this recognition of freedoms to
submit their views. The statements of two associations who replied are
reproduced here following the report of the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee also
invited statements by Messrs. Halbrook and Hardy, and by the National Rifle
Association, whose statements likewise follow our report.

When I became chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, I hoped that
I would be able to assist in the protection of the constitutional rights of
American citizens, rights which have too often been eroded in the belief that
government could be relied upon for quick solutions to difficult problems.

Both as an American citizen and as a United States Senator I repudiate this
view. I likewise repudiate the approach of those who believe to solve American
problems you simply become something other than American. To my mind, the
uniqueness of our free institutions, the fact that an American citizen can boast
freedoms unknown in any other land, is all the more reason to resist any erosion
of our individual rights. When our ancestors forged a land "conceived in
liberty", they did so with musket and rifle. When they reacted to attempts
to dissolve their free institutions, and established their identity as a free
nation, they did so as a nation of armed freemen. When they sought to record
forever a guarantee of their rights, they devoted one full amendment out of ten
to nothing but the protection of their right to keep and bear arms against
governmental interference. Under my chairmanship the Subcommittee on the
Constitution will concern itself with a proper recognition of, and respect for,
this right most valued by free men.

Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman

Subcommittee on the Constitution

January 20, 1982

The right to bear arms is a tradition with deep roots in American society.
Thomas Jefferson proposed that "no free man shall ever be debarred the use of
arms," and Samuel Adams called for an amendment banning any law "to
prevent the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens from keeping
their own arms." The Constitution of the State of Arizona, for example,
recognizes the "right of an individual citizen to bear arms in defense of
himself or the State."

Even though the tradition has deep roots, its application to modern America
is the subject of intense controversy. Indeed, it is a controversy into which
the Congress is beginning, once again, to immerse itself. I have personally been
disappointed that so important an issue should have generally been so thinly
researched and so minimally debated both in Congress and the courts. Our Supreme
Court has but once touched on its meaning at the Federal level and that
decision, now nearly a half-century old, is so ambiguous that any school of
thought can find some support in it. All Supreme Court decisions on the second
amendment's application to the States came in the last century, when
constitutional law was far different than it is today. As ranking minority
member of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, I, therefore, welcome the effort
which led to this report — a report based not only upon the independent research
of the subcommittee staff, but also upon full and fair presentation of the cases
by all interested groups and individual scholars.

I personally believe that it is necessary for the Congress to amend the Gun
Control Act of 1968. I welcome the opportunity to introduce this discussion of
how best these amendments might be made.

The Constitution subcommittee staff has prepared this monograph bringing
together proponents of both sides of the debate over the 1968 Act. I believe
that the statements contained herein present the arguments fairly and
thoroughly. I commend Senator Hatch, chairman of the subcommittee, for having
this excellent reference work prepared. I am sure that it will be of great
assistance to the Congress as it debates the second amendment and considers
legislation to amend the Gun Control Act.

Dennis DeConcini,

Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on the Constitution

January 20, 1982

History: Second Amendment Right to "Keep and Bear Arms"

The right to keep and bear arms as a part of English and American law
antedates not only the Constitution, but also the discovery of firearms. Under
the laws of Alfred the Great, whose reign began in 872 A.D., all English
citizens from the nobility to the peasants were obliged to privately purchase
weapons and be available for military duty. 1 This
was in sharp contrast to the feudal system as it evolved in Europe, under which
armament and military duties were concentrated in the nobility. The body of
armed citizens were known as the "fyrd".

While a great many of the Saxon rights were abridged following the Norman
conquest, the right and duty of arms possession was retained. Under the Assize
of Arms of 1181, "the whole community of freemen" between the ages of 15
and 40 were required by law to possess certain arms, which were arranged in
proportion to their possessions. 2 They
were required twice a year to demonstrate to Royal officials that they were
appropriately armed. In 1253, another Assize of Arms expanded the duty of
armament to include not only freemen, but also villeins, who were the English
equivalent of serfs. Now all "citizens, burgesses, free tenants, villeins and
others from 15 to 60 years of age" were obligated to be armed. 3
While on the Continent the villeins were regarded as little more than animals
hungering for rebellion, the English legal system not only permitted, but
affirmatively required them, to be armed.

The thirteenth century saw further definitions of this right as the long bow,
a formidable armor-piercing weapon, became increasingly the mainstay of British
national policy. In 1285, Edward I commanded that all persons comply with the
earlier Assizes and added that "anyone else who can afford them shall keep
bows and arrows." 4 The
right of armament was subject only to narrow limitations. In 1279, it was
ordered that those appearing in Parliament or other public assemblies "shall
come without all force and armor, well and peaceably". 5 In
1328, the statute of Northampton ordered that no one use their arms in
"affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by day or by night in fairs,
markets, nor in the presence of the justices or other ministers." 6
English courts construed this ban consistently with the general right of private
armament as applying only to wearing of arms "accompanied with such
circumstances as are apt to terrify the people." 7 In
1369, the King ordered that the sheriffs of London require all citizens "at
leisure time on holidays" to "use in their recreation bowes and
arrows" and to stop all other games which might distract them from this
practice. 8

The Tudor kings experimented with limits upon specialized weapons — mainly
crossbows and the then-new firearms. These measures were not intended to disarm
the citizenry, but on the contrary, to prevent their being diverted from longbow
practice by sport with other weapons which were considered less effective. Even
these narrow measures were shortlived. In 1503, Henry VII limited shooting (but
not possession) of crossbows to those with land worth 200 marks annual rental,
but provided an exception for those who "shote owt of a howse for the
lawefull defens of the same". 9 In
1511, Henry VIII increased the property requirement to 300 marks. He also
expanded the requirement of longbow ownership, requiring all citizens to "use
and exercyse shootyng in longbowes, and also have a bowe and arrowes
contynually" in the house. 10
Fathers were required by law to purchase bows and arrows for their sons between
the age of 7 and 14 and to train them in longbow use.

In 1514 the ban on crossbows was extended to include firearms. 11 But
in 1533, Henry reduced the property qualification to 100 pounds per year; in
1541 he limited it to possession of small firearms ("of the length of one
hole yard" for some firearms and "thre quarters of a yarde" for
others)12and
eventually he repealed the entire statute by proclamation.13 The
later Tudor monarchs continued the system and Elizabeth added to it by creating
what came to be known as "train bands", selected portions of the citizenry
chosen for special training. These trained bands were distinguished from the
"militia", which term was first used during the Spanish Armada crisis to
designate the entire of the armed citizenry. 14

The militia continued to be a pivotal force in the English political system.
The British historian Charles Oman considers the existence of the armed
citizenry to be a major reason for the moderation of monarchical rule in Great
Britain; "More than once he [Henry VIII] had to restrain himself, when he
discovered that the general feeling of his subjects was against him... His
'gentlemen pensioners' and yeomen of the guard were but a handful, and bills or
bows were in every farm and cottage". 15

When civil war broke out in 1642, the critical issue was whether the King or
Parliament had the right to control the militia. 16 The
aftermath of the civil war saw England in temporary control of a military
government, which repeated dissolved Parliament and authorized its officers to
"search for, and seize all arms" owned by Catholics, opponents of the
government, "or any other person whom the commissioners had judged dangerous
to the peace of this Commonwealth". 17

The military government ended with the restoration of Charles II. Charles in
turn opened his reign with a variety of repressive legislation, expanding the
definition of treason, establishing press censorship and ordering his supporters
to form their own troops, "the officers to be numerous, disaffected persons
watched and not allowed to assemble, and their arms seized". 18 In
1662, a Militia Act was enacted empowering officials " to search for and
seize all arms in the custody or possession of any person or persons whom the
said lieutenants or any two or more of their deputies shall judge dangerous to
the peace of the kingdom". 19
Gunsmiths were ordered to deliver to the government lists of all purchasers.
20
These confiscations were continued under James II, who directed them
particularly against the Irish population: "Although the country was infested
by predatory bands, a Protestant gentleman could scarcely obtain permission to
keep a brace of pistols." 21

In 1668, the government of James was overturned in a peaceful uprising which
came to be know as "The Glorious Revolution". Parliament resolved that
James had abdicated and promulgated a Declaration of Rights, later enacted as
the Bill of Rights. Before coronation, his successor William of Orange, was
required to swear to respect these rights. The debates in the House of Commons
over this Declaration of Rights focused largely upon the disarmament under the
1662 Militia Act. One member complained that "an act of Parliament was made
to disarm all Englishmen, who the lieutenant should suspect, by day or night, by
force or otherwise — this was done in Ireland for the sake of putting arms into
Irish hands." The speech of another is summarized as "militia bill —
power to disarm all England — now done in Ireland." A third complained
"Arbitrary power exercised by the ministry. . . . Militia — imprisoning
without reason; disarming — himself disarmed." Yet another summarized his
complaints "Militia Act — an abominable thing to disarm the nation...."
22

The Bill of Rights, as drafted in the House of Commons, simply provided that
"the acts concerning the militia are grievous to the subject" and that
"it is necessary for the public Safety that the Subjects, which are
Protestants, should provide and keep arms for the common defense; And that the
Arms which have been seized, and taken from them, be restored." 23 The
House of Lords changed this to make it a more positive declaration of an
individual right under English law: "That the subjects which are Protestant
may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by
law." 24 The
only limitation was on ownership by Catholics, who at that time composed only a
few percent of the British population and were subject to a wide variety of
punitive legislation. The Parliament subsequently made clear what it meant by
"suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law". The poorer citizens
had been restricted from owning firearms, as well as traps and other commodities
useful for hunting, by the 1671 Game Act. Following the Bill of Rights,
Parliament reenacted that statute, leaving its operative parts unchanged with
one exception — which removed the word "guns" from the list of items
forbidden to the poorer citizens. 25 The
right to keep and bear arms would henceforth belong to all English subjects,
rich and poor alike.

In the colonies, availability of hunting and need for defense led to armament
statutes comparable to those of the early Saxon times. In 1623, Virginia forbade
its colonists to travel unless the were "well armed"; in 1631 it required
colonists to engage in target practice on Sunday and "to bring their peeces
to church." 26 In
1658 it required every householder to have a functioning firearm within his
house and in 1673 its laws provided that a citizen who claimed he was too poor
to purchase a firearm would have one purchased for him by the government, which
would then require him to pay a reasonable price when able to do so. 27 In
Massachusetts, the first session of the legislature ordered that not only
freemen, but also indentured servants own firearms and in 1644 it imposed a
stern 6 shilling fine upon any citizen who was not armed. 28

When the British government began to increase its military presence in the
colonies in the mid-eighteenth century, Massachusetts responded by calling upon
its citizens to arm themselves in defense. One colonial newspaper argued that it
was impossible to complain that this act was illegal since they were "British
subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recognized by
the Bill of Rights" while another argued that this "is a natural right
which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights,
to keep arms for their own defense". 29 The
newspaper cited Blackstone's commentaries on the laws of England, which had
listed the "having and using arms for self preservation and defense" among the
"absolute rights of individuals." The colonists felt they had an absolute
right at common law to own firearms.

Together with freedom of the press, the right to keep and bear arms became
one of the individual rights most prized by the colonists. When British troops
seized a militia arsenal in September, 1774, and incorrect rumors that colonists
had been killed spread through Massachusetts, 60,000 citizens took up arms.
30 A
few months later, when Patrick Henry delivered his famed "Give me liberty or
give me death" speech, he spoke in support of a proposition "that a well
regulated militia, composed of gentlemen and freemen, is the natural strength
and only security of a free government...." Throughout the following
revolution, formal and informal units of armed citizens obstructed British
communication, cut off foraging parties, and harassed the thinly stretched
regular forces. When seven states adopted state "bills of rights"
following the Declaration of Independence, each of those bills of rights
provided either for protection of the concept of a militia or for an express
right to keep and bear arms. 31

Following the revolution but previous to the adoption of the Constitution,
debates over militia proposals occupied a large part of the political scene. A
variety of plans were put forth by figures ranging from George Washington to
Baron von Steuben. 32 All
the proposals called for a general duty of all citizens to be armed, although
some proposals (most notably von Steuben's) also emphasized a "select
militia" which would be paid for its services and given special training. In
this respect, this "select militia" was the successor of the "trained
bands" and the predecessor of what is today the "national guard". In
the debates over the Constitution, von Steuben's proposals were criticized as
undemocratic. In Connecticut on writer complained of a proposal that "this
looks too much like Baron von Steuben's militia, by which a standing army was
meant and intended." 33 In
Pennsylvania, a delegate argued "Congress may give us a select militia which
will, in fact, be a standing army — or Congress, afraid of a general militia,
may say there will be no militia at all. When a select militia is formed, the
people in general may be disarmed." 34
Richard Henry Lee, in his widely read pamphlet "Letters from the Federal
Farmer to the Republican" worried that the people might be disarmed "by
modeling the militia. Should one fifth or one eighth part of the people capable
of bearing arms be made into a select militia, as has been proposed, and those
the young and ardent parts of the community, possessed of little or no property,
the former will answer all the purposes of an army, while the latter will be
defenseless." He proposed that "the Constitution ought to secure a
genuine, and guard against a select militia," adding that "to preserve
liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms
and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them." 35

The suspicion of select militia units expressed in these passages is a clear
indication that the framers of the Constitution did not seek to guarantee a
State right to maintain formed groups similar to the National Guard, but rather
to protect the right of individual citizens to keep and bear arms. Lee, in
particular, sat in the Senate which approved the Bill of Rights. He would hardly
have meant the second amendment to apply only to the select militias he so
feared and disliked.

Other figures of the period were of like mind. In the Virginia convention,
George Mason, drafter of the Virginia Bill of Rights, accused the British of
having plotted "to disarm the people — that was the best and most effective
way to enslave them", while Patrick Henry observed that, "The great
object is that every man be armed" and "everyone who is able may have a
gun". 36

Nor were the antifederalists, to whom we owe credit for a Bill of Rights,
alone on this account. Federalist arguments also provide a source of support for
an individual rights view. Their arguments in favor of the proposed Constitution
also relied heavily upon universal armament. The proposed Constitution had been
heavily criticized for its failure to ban or even limit standing armies. Unable
to deny this omission, the Constitution's supporters frequently argued to the
people that the universal armament of Americans made such limitations
unnecessary. A pamphlet written by Noah Webster, aimed at swaying Pennsylvania
toward ratification, observed.

Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they
are in almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot
enforce unjust laws by the sword, because the whole body of the people are
armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can
be, on any pretense, raised in the United States. 37

In the Massachusetts convention, Sedgewick echoed the same thought,
rhetorically asking an oppressive army could be formed or "if raised, whether
they could subdue a Nation of freemen, who know how to prize liberty, and who
have arms in their hands?" 38 In
Federalist Paper 46, Madison, later author of the Second Amendment, mentioned
"The advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of
all other countries" and that "notwithstanding the military
establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as
the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people
with arms."

A third and even more compelling case for an individual rights perspective on
the Second Amendment comes from the State demands for a bill of rights. Numerous
state ratifications called for adoption of a Bill of Rights as a part of the
Constitution. The first such call came from a group of Pennsylvania delegates.
Their proposals, which were not adopted but had a critical effect on future
debates, proposed among other rights that "the people have a right to bear
arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or
for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the
people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or a real danger of public
injury from individuals." 39 In
Massachusetts, Sam Adams unsuccessfully pushed for a ratification conditioned on
adoption of a Bill of Rights, beginning with a guarantee "That the said
Constitution shall never be construed to authorize Congress to infringe the just
liberty of the press or the rights of conscience; or to prevent the people of
the United States who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own
arms...." 40
When New Hampshire gave the Constitution the ninth vote needed for its passing
into effect, it called for adoption of a Bill of Rights which included the
provision that "Congress shall never disarm any citizen unless such as are or
have been in actual rebellion". 41
Virginia and North Carolina thereafter called for a provision "that the
people have the right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia
composed of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and
safe defense of a free state." 42

When the first Congress convened for the purpose of drafting a Bill of
Rights, it delegated the task to James Madison. Madison did not write upon a
blank tablet. Instead, he obtained a pamphlet listing the State proposals for a
Bill of Rights and sought to produce a briefer version incorporating all the
vital proposals of these. His purpose was to incorporate, not distinguish by
technical changes, proposals such as that of the Pennsylvania minority, Sam
Adams, and the New Hampshire delegates. Madison proposed among other rights
that:

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a
well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free
country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render military service." 43

In the House, this was initially modified so that the militia clause came
before the proposal recognizing the right. The proposals for the Bill of Rights
were then trimmed in the interests of brevity. The conscientious objector clause
was removed following objections by Eldridge Gerry, who complained that future
Congresses might abuse the exemption for the scrupulous to excuse everyone from
military service.

The proposal finally passed the House in its present form: "A well
regulated militia, being necessary for the security of a free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." In this form
it was submitted to the Senate, which passed it the following day. The Senate in
the process indicated its intent that the right be an individual one, for
private purposes, by rejecting an amendment which would have limited the keeping
and bearing of arms to bearing "for the common defense".

The earliest American constitutional commentators concurred in giving this
broad reading to the amendment. When St. George Tucker, later Chief Justice of
the Virginia Supreme Court, in 1803 published an edition of Blackstone annotated
to American law, he followed Blackstone's citation of the right of the
subject"of having arms suitable to their condition and degree, and such as
are allowed by law" with a citation to the Second Amendment, "And this
without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the
British government." 44William
Rawle's "View of the Constitution" published in Philadelphia in 1825
noted that under the Second Amendment

"The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by a
rule of construction be conceived to give to Congress a power to disarm the
people. Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general
pretense by a state legislature. But if in blind pursuit of inordinate power,
either should at tempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on
both." 45

The Jefferson papers in the Library of Congress show that both Tucker and
Rawle were friends of, and corresponded with, Thomas Jefferson. This suggests
that their assessment, as contemporaries of the Constitution's drafters, should
be afforded special consideration.

Later commentators agreed with Tucker and Rawle. For instance, Joseph Story
in his "Commentaries on
the Constitution" considered the right to keep and bear arms as "the
palladium of the liberties of the republic", which deterred tyranny and
enabled the citizenry at large to overthrow it should it come to pass. 46

Subsequent legislation in the second Congress likewise supports the
interpretation of the Second Amendment that creates an individual right. In the
Militia Act of 1792, the second Congress defined "militia of the United
States" to include almost every free adult male in the United States. These
persons were obligated by law to possess a firearm and a minimum supply of
ammunition and military equipment. 47
This statute, incidentally, remained in effect into the early years of the
present century as a legal requirement of gun ownership for most of the
population of the United States. There can by little doubt from this that when
the Congress and the people spoke of a "militia", they had reference to the
traditional concept of the entire populace capable of bearing arms, and not to
any formal group such as what is today called the National Guard. The purpose
was to create an armed citizenry, such as the political theorists at the time
considered essential to ward off tyranny. From this militia, appropriate
measures might create a "well regulated militia" of individuals trained
in their duties and responsibilities as citizens and owners of firearms.

The Second Amendment as such was rarely litigated prior to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Prior to that time, most courts accepted that the commands
of the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Since there was no
federal firearms legislation at this time, there was no legislation which was
directly subject to the Second Amendment, if the accepted interpretations were
followed. However, a broad variety of state legislation was struck down under
state guarantees of the right to keep and bear arms and even in a few cases,
under the Second Amendment, when it came before courts which considered the
federal protections applicable to the states. Kentucky in 1813 enacted the first
carrying concealed weapon statute in the United States; in 1822, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals struck down the law as a violation of the state constitutional
protection of the right to keep and bear arms; "And can there be entertained
a reasonable doubt but the provisions of that act import a restraint on the
right of the citizen to bear arms? The court apprehends it not. The right
existed at the adoption of the Constitution; it then had no limit short of the
moral power of the citizens to exercise it, and in fact consisted of nothing
else but the liberty of the citizen to bear arms." 48 On
the other hand, a similar measure was sustained in Indiana, not upon the grounds
that a right to keep and bear arms did not apply, but rather upon the notion
that a statute banning only concealed carrying still permitted the carrying of
arms and merely regulated on possible way of carrying them. 49 A
few years later, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld a similar statute but
added, "We do not desire to be understood as maintaining, that in regulating
the manner of wearing arms, the legislature has no other limit than its own
discretion. A statute which, under the pretense of regulation, amounts to a
destruction of that right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render
them wholly useless for the purpose of defense, would be clearly
unconstitutional." 50
When the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1842 upheld a carrying concealed weapons
statute, the chief justice explained that the statute would not "detract
anything from the power of the people to defend their free state and the
established institutions of the country. It prohibits only the wearing of
certain arms concealed. This is simply a regulation as to the manner of bearing
such arms as are specified", while the dissenting justice proclaimed "I deny
that any just or free government upon earth has the power to disarm its
citizens". 51

Sometimes courts went farther. When in 1837, Georgia totally banned the sale
of pistols (excepting the larger pistols "known and used as horsemen's
pistols" ) and other weapons, the Georgia Supreme Court in Nunn v.
State held the statute unconstitutional under the Second Amendment to
the federal Constitution. The court held that the Bill of Rights protected
natural rights which were fully as capable of infringement by states as by the
federal government and that the Second Amendment provided "the right of the
whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep
and bear arms of every description, and not merely such as are used by the
militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in on, in the slightest
degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and
qualifying of a well regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of
a free state." 52
Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court of the United States likewise
indicated that the privileges of citizenship included the individual right to
own and carry firearms. In the notorious Dred Scott case, the court held that
black Americans were not citizens and could not be made such by any state. This
decision, which by striking down the Missouri Compromise did so much to bring on
the Civil War, listed what the Supreme Court considered the rights of American
citizens by way of illustrating what rights would have to be given to black
Americans if the Court were to recognize them as full fledged citizens:

It would give to persons of the negro race, who are recognized as
citizens in any one state of the Union, the right to enter every other state,
whenever they pleased. . . .and it would give them full liberty of speech in
public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might
meet; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry
arms wherever they went. 53

Following the Civil War, the legislative efforts which gave us three
amendments to the Constitution and our earliest civil rights acts likewise
recognized the right to keep and bear arms as an existing constitutional right
of the individual citizen and as a right specifically singled out as one
protected by the civil rights acts and by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, against infringement by state authorities. Much of the
reconstruction effort in the South had been hinged upon the creation of "black
militias" composed of the armed and newly freed blacks, officered largely by
black veterans of the Union Army. In the months after the Civil War, the
existing southern governments struck at these units with the enactment of "black
codes" which either outlawed gun ownership by blacks entirely, or imposed permit
systems for them, and permitted the confiscation of firearms owned by blacks.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was debated members both of the Senate and the
House referred to the disarmament of blacks as a major consideration. 54
Senator Trumbull cited provisions outlawing ownership of arms by blacks as among
those which the Civil Rights Act would prevent. 55
Senator Sulsbury complained on the other hand that if the act were to be passed
it would prevent his own state from enforcing a law banning gun ownership by
individual free blacks. 56
Similar arguments were advanced during the debates over the "anti-KKK act"; its
sponsor at one point explained that a section making it a federal crime to
deprive a person of "arms or weapons he may have in his house or possession
for the defense of his person, family, or property" was "intended to
enforce the well-known constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right in the
citizen 'keep and bear arms'." 57
Likewise, in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment Congress frequently
referred to the Second Amendment as one of the rights which it intended to
guarantee against state action. 58

Following adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Supreme Court
held that that Amendment's prohibition against states depriving any persons of
their federal "privileges and immunities" was to be given a narrow
construction. In particular, the "privileges and immunities" under the
Constitution would refer only to those rights which were not felt to exist as a
process of natural right, but which were created solely by the Constitution.
These might refer to rights such as voting in federal elections and of
interstate travel, which would clearly not exist except by virtue of the
existence of a federal government and which could not be said to be "natural
rights". 59
This paradoxically meant that the rights which most persons would accept as the
most important — those flowing from concepts of natural justice — were devalued
at the expense of more technical rights. Thus when individuals were charged with
having deprived black citizens of their right to freedom of assembly and to keep
and bear arms, by violently breaking up a peaceable assembly of black citizens,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Cruikshank 60
held that no indictment could be properly brought since the right "of bearing
arms for a lawful purpose" is "not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its
existence." Nor, in the view of the Court, was the right to peacefully
assemble a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: "The right of the
people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long before the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, it is and has always
been one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government. . . .It was
not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution." Thus the
very importance of the rights protected by the First and Second Amendment was
used as the basis for the argument that they did not apply to the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In later opinions, chiefly Presser v.
Illinois 61
andMiller v. Texas 62 the
Supreme Court adhered to the view. Cruikshank has clearly been superseded by
twentieth century opinions which hold that portions of the Bill of Rights — and
in particular the right to assembly with which Cruikshank dealt in addition to
the Second Amendment — are binding upon the state governments. Given the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the more expanded views of incorporation which have become accepted in our own
century, it is clear that the right to keep and bear arms was meant to be and
should be protected under the civil rights statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment
against infringement by officials acting under color of state law.

Within our own century, the only occasion upon which the Second Amendment has
reached the Supreme Court came in United States v. Miller. 63
There, a prosecution for carrying a sawed off shotgun was dismissed before trial
on Second Amendment grounds. In doing so, the court took no evidence as to the
nature of the firearm or indeed any other factual matter. The Supreme Court
reversed on procedural grounds, holding that the trial court could not take
judicial notice of the relationship between a firearm and the Second Amendment,
but must receive some manner of evidence. It did not formulate a test nor state
precisely what relationship might be required. The court's statement that the
amendment was adopted "to assure the continuation and render possible the
effectiveness of such [militia] forces" and "must be interpreted and applied
with that end in view", when combined with the court's statement that all
constitutional sources "show plainly enough that the militia comprised all males
physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.... these men
were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in
common use at the time," 64
suggests that at the very least private ownership by a person capable of self
defense and using an ordinary privately owned firearm must be protected by the
Second Amendment. What the Court did not do in Miller is even more striking: It
did not suggest that the lower court take evidence on whether Miller belonged to
the National Guard or a similar group. The hearing was to be on the nature of
the firearm, not on the nature of its use; nor is there a single suggestion that
National Guard status is relevant to the case.

The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms therefore, is a right of the
individual citizen to privately possess and carry in a peaceful manner firearms
and similar arms. Such an "individual rights" interpretation is in full
accord with the history of the right to keep and bear arms, as previously
discussed. It is moreover in accord with contemporaneous statements and
formulations of the right by such founders of this nation as Thomas Jefferson
and Samuel Adams, and accurately reflects the majority of the proposals which
led up to the Bill of Rights itself. A number of state constitutions, adopted
prior to or contemporaneously with the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights,
similarly provided for a right of the people to keep and bear arms. If in fact
this language creates a right protecting the states only, there might be a
reason for it to be inserted in the federal Constitution but no reason for it to
be inserted in state constitutions. State bills of rights necessarily protect
only against action by the state, and by definition a state cannot infringe its
own rights; to attempt to protect a right belonging to the state by inserting it
in a limitation of the state's own powers would create an absurdity. The fact
that the contemporaries of the framers did insert these words into several state
constitutions would indicate clearly that they viewed the right as belonging to
the individual citizen, thereby making it a right which could be infringed
either by state or federal government and which must be protected against
infringement by both.

Finally, the individual rights interpretation gives full meaning to the words
chosen by the first Congress to reflect the right to keep and bear arms. The
framers of the Bill of Rights consistently used the words "right of the people"
to reflect individual rights — as when these words were used to recognize the
"right of the people" to peaceably assemble, and the "right of the people"
against unreasonable searches and seizures. They distinguished between the
rights of the people and of the state in the Tenth Amendment. As discussed
earlier, the "militia" itself referred to a concept of a universally armed
people, not to any specifically organized unit. When the framers referred to the
equivalent of our National Guard, they uniformly used the term "select militia"
and distinguished this from "militia". Indeed, the debates over the Constitution
constantly referred to the organized militia units as a threat to freedom
comparable to that of a standing army, and stressed that such organized units
did not constituted, and indeed were philosophically opposed to, the concept of
a militia.

That the National Guard is not the "Militia" referred to in the second
amendment is even clearer today. Congress has organized the National Guard under
its power to "raise and support armies" and not its power to "Provide
for the organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia". 65
This Congress chose to do in the interests of organizing reserve military units
which were not limited in deployment by the strictures of our power over the
constitutional militia, which can be called forth only "to execute the laws
of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." The modern
National Guard was specifically intended to avoid status as the constitutional
militia, a distinction recognized by 10 U.S.C. Sec. 311(a).

The conclusion is thus inescapable that the history, concept, and wording of
the second amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as its
interpretation by every major commentator and court in the first half century
after its ratification, indicates that what is protected is an individual right
of a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner.

REFERENCES

1. Charles Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military
Institutions 11-42 (Oxford University Press 1962); Francis Grose,
Military Antiquities Respecting a History of the British Army, Vol. I at
1-2 (London, 1812).

2. Grose, supra, at 9-11; Bruce Lyon,
A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England. 273 (2nd. ed. New
York 1980).

3. J.J. Bagley and P.B. Rowley, A Documentary
History of England. 1066-1540, Vol. I at 155-56 (New York 1965).

4. Statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I c. 6). See
also Bagley and Rowley, supra at 158.

5. 7 Ed. I c.2 (1279).

6. Statute of Northampton (2nd Edw. III c.
3).

7. Rex v. Knight, 90 Eng. Rep. 330; 87
Eng. Rep. 75 (King's Bench, 1686).

8. E. G. Heath, The Grey Goose Wing 109 (London,
1971).

9. 19 Hen. VII c. 4 (1503).

10. 3 Hen. VIII c. 13 (1511).

11. 64 Hen. VIII c. 13 (1514).

12. 33 Hen. VIII c. 6 (1514).

13. Noel Perrin, Giving Up the Gun 59-60
(Boston, 1979)

14. Jim Hill, The Minuteman in War and
Peace 26-27 (Harrisburg, 1968)

15. Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War
in the Sixteenth Century 288 (New York, 1937).

16. William Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. 2
at 412 (St. George Tucker, ed., Philadelphia 1803).

17. "An Act for Settling the Militia,"
Ordinances and Acts of the Interregnum, Vol. 2 1320 (London, HMSO
1911).

18. 8 Calender of State Papers (Domestic),
Charles II, No. 188, p. 150.

19. 14 Car. II c. 3 (1662).

20. Joyce Malcolm, Disarmed: The Loss of the
Right to Bear Arms in Restoration England, at 11 (Mary Ingraham Bunting
Institute, Radcliffe College 1980).

21. Thomas Macaulay, The History of England
from the Accession of Charles II, Vol. II at 137 (London, 1856).

22. Phillip, Earl of Hardwicke, Miscellaneous
State Papers from 1501-1726, vol. 2 at 407-17 (London, 1778).

23. J. R. Western, Monarchy and Revolution:
The English State in the 1680's, at 339 (Totowa, N.J., 1972).

24. Journal of the House of Commons from
December 26, 1688 to October 26, 1693, at 29. (London, 1742). The Bill of Rights
was ultimately enacted in this form. 1 Gul. and Mar. Sess., 2, c. 2
(1689).

25. Joyce Malcolm, supra, at
16.

26. William Hening, The Statutes at Large:
Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the
Legislature in 1619, at pp. 127, 173-74 (New York, 1823).

27. Id.

28. William Brigham, The Compact with the
Charter and Laws of the Colony of New Plymouth, 31, 76 (Boston,
1836).

29. Oliver Dickerson, ed., Boston Under
Military Rule, 61, 79 (Boston, 1936).

30. Steven Patterson, Political Parties in
Revolutionary Massachusetts, at 103 (University of Wisconsin Press,
1973).

31. See Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51
A.B.A.J. 554, 665 (1965).

32. The most extensive studies of these militia
proposals are John Macauly Palmer, Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War
Statesmen (New York, 1930); Frederick Stern, Citizen Army (New York,
1957); John Mahon, The American Militia: Decade of Decision 1789-1800
(Univ. of Florida, 1960).

33. Merrill Jensen, ed., The Documentary of
History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 3 at 378 (Madison,
Wisc.)

34. Id., vol. 2 at 508.

35. Walter Bennet, ed., Letters from the
Federal Farmer to the Republican, at 21, 22, 124 (Univ. of Alabama Press,
1975).

36. Debates and other Proceedings of the
Convention of Virginia, . . . taken in shorthand by David Robertson of
Petersburg, at 271, 275 (2nd ed. Richmond, 1805).

37. Noah Webster, "An Examination into the
Leading Principles of the Federal States, at 56 (New York, 1888).

38. Jonathan Elliot, ed., Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol.
2 at 97 (2nd ed., 1888).

39. Merril Jensen, supra, vol. 2 at
597-98.

40. Debates and Proceeding at the Convention
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at 86-87 (Pierce & Hale, eds.,
Boston, 1850); 2 B. Schwartz, the Bill of Rights 675 (1971).

41. Documents Illustrative of the Formation
of the Union of the American States, at 1026 (Washington, D.C., GPO,
1927).

42. Id. at 1030.

43. Annals of Congress 434
(1789).

44. St. George Tucker, ed., Blackstone's
Commentaries, Volume 1 at 143 n. 40, 41 (Philadelphia, 1803).

45. William Rawle, A View of the
Constitution 125-6 (2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1803).

46. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution, vol. 2 at 746 (1833).

47. Act of May 8, 1792; Second Cong., First
Session, ch. 33.

48. Bliss vs. Commonwealth, 12 Ken. (2
Litt.) 90, 92 (1822).

49. State v. Mitchell, (3 Black.)
229.

50. State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 35 Am.
Dec. 44 (1840).

51. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27, 36
(1842). The Arkansas Constitutional provision at issue was narrower than the
second amendment, as it protected keeping and bearing arms "for the common
defense." Id. at 34.

52. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251
(1846).

53. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 691,
705.

54. The most comprehensive work in this field of
constitutional law is Steven Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments (Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, California,
1979), reprinted in 4 George Mason L. Rev. 1 (1981).

55. Cong. Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Sess., pt.
1, p. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866).

56. Id. at 478.

57. H.R. Rep. No. 37, 41st Cong., 3d sess., p. 3
(1871).

58. See generally Halbrook, supra, at
42-62.

59. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(L873).

60. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876).

61. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886).

62. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535
(1894).

63. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 175
(1939).

64. Id. at 178, 179.

65. H.R. Report No. 141, 73d Cong., 1st sess. at
2-5 (1933).

APPENDIX

Case Law

The United States Supreme Court has only three times commented upon the
meaning of the second amendment to our constitution. The first comment, in Dred
Scott, indicated strongly that the right to keep and bear arms was an individual
right; the Court noted that, were it to hold blacks to be entitled to equality
of citizenship, they would be entitled to keep and carry arms wherever they
went. The second, in Miller, indicated that a court cannot take judicial notice
that a short-barrelled shotgun is covered by the second amendment — but the
Court did not indicate that National Guard status is in any way required for
protection by that amendment, and indeed defined "militia" to include all
citizens able to bear arms. The third, a footnote in Lewis v. United States,
indicated only that "these legislative restrictions on the use of firearms" — a
ban on possession by felons — were permissable [sic]. But since felons may
constitutionally be deprived of many of the rights of citizens, including that
of voting, this dicta reveals little. These three comments constitute all
significant explanations of the scope of the second amendment advanced by our
Supreme Court. The case of Adam v. Williams has been cited as contrary to the
principle that the second amendment is an individual right. In fact, that
reading of the opinion comes only in Justice Douglas's dissent from the majority
ruling of the Court.

The appendix which follows represents a listing of twenty-one American
decisions, spanning the period from 1822 to 1981, which have analyzed right to
keep and bear arms provisions in the light of statutes ranging from complete
bans on handgun sales to bans on carrying of weapons to regulation of carrying
by permit systems. Those decisions not only explained the nature of such a
right, but also struck down legislative restrictions as violative of it, are
designated by asterisks.

20TH CENTURY CASES

1. State v. Blocker, 291 Or. 255, — — — P. 2d — — — (1981).

"The statue is written as a total proscription of the mere possession of
certain weapons, and that mere possession, insofar as a billy is concerned, is
constitutionally protected."

"In these circumstances, we conclude that it is proper for us to
consider defendant's 'overbreadth' attack to mean that the statute swept so
broadly as to infringe rights that it could not reach, which in the setting
means the right to possess arms guaranteed by sec 27."

2. State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P. 2d 94, at 95, at 98
(1980).

"We are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the wisdom of
a right to bear arms, and that the original motivations for such a provision
might not seem compelling if debated as a new issue. Our task, however, in
construing a constitutional provision is to respect the principles given the
status of constitutional guarantees and limitations by the drafters; it is not
to abandon these principles when this fits the needs of the moment."

"Therefore, the term 'arms' as used by the drafters of the
constitutions probably was intended to include those weapons used by settlers
for both personal and military defense. The term 'arms' was not limited to
firearms, but included several handcarried weapons commonly used for defense.
The term 'arms' would not have included cannon or other heavy ordnance not
kept by militiamen or private citizens."

3. Motley v. Kellogg, 409 N.E. 2d 1207, at 1210 (Ind. App. 1980)
(motion to transfer denied 1-27-1981).

"[N]ot making applications available at the chief's office effectively
denied members of the community the opportunity to obtain a gun permit and
bear arms for their self-defense."

4. Schubert v. DeBard, 398 N.E. 2d 1339, at 1341 (Ind. App. 1980)
(motion to transfer denied 8-28-1980).

"We think it clear that our constitution provides our citizenry the right
to bear arms for their self- defense."

5. Taylor v. McNeal, 523 S.W. 2d 148, at 150 (Mo. App. 1975)

"The pistols in question are not contraband. * * * Under Art. I, sec 23,
Mo. Const. 1945, V.A.M.S., every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms
in defense of his home, person, and property, with the limitation that this
section shall not justify the wearing of concealed arms."

6. City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P. 2d 744, at 745
(en banc 1972).

"As an example, we note that this ordinance would prohibit gunsmiths,
pawnbrokers and sporting goods stores from carrying on a substantial part of
their business. Also, the ordinance appears to prohibit individuals from
transporting guns to and from such places of business. Furthermore, it makes
it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm in a vehicle or in a place of
business for the purpose of self-defense. Several of these activities are
constitutionally protected. Colo. Const. art. II, sec 13."

7. City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 82 N.M. 626, 485 P. 2d 737, at 738
(N.M. App. 1971).

"It is our opinion that an ordinance may not deny the people the
constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms, and to that extent the
ordinance under consideration is void."

8. State v. Nickerson, 126 Mt. 157, 247 P. 2d 188, at 192 (1952).

"The law of this jurisdiction accords to the defendant the right to keep
and bear arms and to use same in defense of his own home, his person and
property."

9. People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419, 94 N.E. 2d 320, at 323 (1950).

"The second amendment to the constitution of the United States provides
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. This of
course does not prevent the enactment of a law against carrying concealed
weapons, but it does indicate it should be kept in mind, in the construction
of a statue of such character, that it is aimed at persons of criminal
instincts, and for the prevention of crime, and not against use in the
protection of person or property."

10. People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, at 264, 62 P. 2d 246 (en banc
1936).

"It is equally clear that the act wholly disarms aliens for all purposes.
The state . . . cannot disarm any class of persons or deprive them of the
right guaranteed under section 13, article II of the Constitution, to bear
arms in defense of home, person and property. The guaranty thus extended is
meaningless if any person is denied the right to possess arms for such
protection."

11. Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518, at 520, 11
S.W. 2d 678 (1928).

"There is no qualification of the prohibition against the carrying of a
pistol in the city ordinance before us but it is made unlawful 'to carry on or
about the person any pistol,' that is, any sort of pistol in any sort of
manner. *** [W]e must accordingly hold the provision of this ordinance as to
the carrying of a pistol invalid."

12. People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927, at 928 (1922).

"The provision in the Constitution granting the right to all persons to
bear arms is a limitation upon the right of the Legislature to enact any law
to the contrary. The exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be made subject to the will of the sheriff."

13. State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222, at 224 (1921).

"We are of the opinion, however, that 'pistol' ex vi termini is properly
included within the word 'arms,' and that the right to bear such arms cannot
be infringed. The historical use of pistols as 'arms' of offense and defense
is beyond controversy."

"The maintenance of the right to bear arms is a most essential one to
every free people and should not be whittled down by technical constructions."

14. State v. Rosenthal, 75 VT. 295, 55 A. 610, at 611 (1903).

"The people of the state have a right to bear arms for the defense of
themselves and the state. *** The result is that Ordinance No. 10, so far as
it relates to the carrying of a pistol, is inconsistent with and repugnant to
the Constitution and the laws of the state, and it is therefore to that
extent, void."

15. In re Brickey, 8 Ida. 597, at 598-99, 70 p. 609 (1902).

"The second amendment to the federal constitution is in the following
language: 'A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.'
The language of section 11, article I of the constitution of Idaho, is as
follows: 'The people have the right to bear arms for their security and
defense, but the legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by
law.' Under these constitutional provisions, the legislature has no power to
prohibit a citizen from bearing arms in any portion of the state of Idaho,
whether within or without the corporate limits of cities, towns, and
villages."

19TH CENTURY CASES

16. Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, at 560, 34 Am. Rep. 52, at 54
(1878).

"If cowardly and dishonorable men sometimes shoot unarmed men with army
pistols or guns, the evil must be prevented by the penitentiary and gallows,
and not by a general deprivation of constitutional privilege."

17. Jennings v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. App. 298, at 300-01 (1878).

"We believe that portion of the act which provides that, in case of
conviction, the defendant shall forfeit to the county the weapon of weapons so
found on or about his person is not within the scope of legislative authority.
* * * One of his most sacred rights is that of having arms for his own defence
and that of the State. This right is one of the surest safeguards of liberty
and self-preservation."

18. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8, at 17 (1871).

"The passage from Story shows clearly that this right was intended, as we
have maintained in this opinion, and was guaranteed to and to be exercised and
enjoyed by the citizen as such, and not by him as a soldier, or in defense
solely of his political rights."

19. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. (1 Kel.) 243, at 251 (1846).

"The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed." The right
of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only,
to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by
the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the
smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the
rearing up and qualifying a well- regulated militia, so vitally necessary to
the security of a free State."

20. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. 356, at 359-60 (1833).

"But suppose it to be assumed on any ground, that our ancestors adopted
and brought over with them this English statute, [the statute of Northampton,]
or portion of the common law, our constitution has completely abrogated it; it
says, 'that the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for
their common defence.' Article II, sec. 26. * * * By this clause of the
constitution, an express power is given and secured to all the free citizens
of the State to keep and bear arms for their defence, without any
qualification whatever as to their kind or nature; and it is conceived, that
it would be going much too far, to impair by construction or abridgement a
constitutional privilege, which is so declared; neither, after so solemn an
instrument hath said the people may carry arms, can we be permitted to impute
to the acts thus licensed, such a necessarily consequent operation as terror
to the people to be incurred thereby; we must attribute to the framers of it,
the absence of such a view."

21. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, at 92, and 93, 13
Am. Dec. 251 (1822).

"For, in principle, there is no difference between a law prohibiting the
wearing concealed arms, and a law forbidding the wearing such as are exposed;
and if the former be unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise."

"But it should not be forgotten, that it is not only a part of the
right that is secured by the constitution; it is the right entire and
complete, as it existed at the adoption of the constitution; and if any
portion of that right be impaired, immaterial how small the part may be, and
immaterial the order of time at which it be done, it is equally forbidden by
the constitution."

The following represents a list of twelve scholarly articles which have dealt
with the subject of the right to keep and bear arms as reflected in the second
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The scholars who have
undertaken this research range from professors of law, history and philosophy to
a United States Senator. All have concluded that the second amendment is an
individual right protecting American citizens in their peaceful use of
firearms.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, a Study in Judicial
Misinterpretation, 2 Wm. & Mary L. R. 381 (1960)

Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 Am Bar Assn. J. 554 & 665 (2
parts) (1965)

Comment, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A Necessary Constitutional
Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights? 31 Albany L. R.
74 (1967)

Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The Right to Bear Arms, 7
Houston L. R. 1 (1969)

McClure, Firearms and Federalism, 7 Idaho L. R. 197 (1970)

Hardy & Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 Chi.-Kent L. R. 62
(1974)

Weiss, A Reply to Advocates of Gun Control Law, 52 Jour. Urban Law
577 (1974)

Whisker, Historical Development and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W. Va. L. R. 171 (1976)

Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5
Fordham Urban L. J. 31 (1976)

Caplan, Handgun Control: Constitutional or Unconstitutional?, 10
N.C. Central L. J. 53 (1979)

Cantrell, The Right to Bear Arms, 53 Wis Bar Bull. 21 (Oct. 1980)

Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments, 4 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (1981)

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL FIREARMS LAWS FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT

Federal involvement in firearms possession and transfer was not significant
prior to 1934, when the National Firearms Act was adopted. The National Firearms
Act as adopted covered only fully automatic weapons (machine guns and submachine
guns) and rifles and shotguns whose barrel length or overall length fell below
certain limits. Since the Act was adopted under the revenue power, sale of these
firearms was not made subject to a ban or permit system. Instead, each transfer
was made subject to a $200 excise tax, which must be paid prior to transfer; the
identification of the parties to the transfer indirectly accomplished a
registration purpose.

The 1934 Act was followed by the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, which placed
some limitations upon sale of ordinary firearms. Persons engaged in the business
of selling those firearms in interstate commerce were required to obtain a
Federal Firearms License, at an annual cost of $1, and to maintain records of
the name and address of persons to whom they sold firearms. Sales to persons
convicted of violent felonies were prohibited, as were interstate shipments to
persons who lacked the permits required by the law of their state.

Thirty years after adoption of the Federal Firearms Act, the Gun Control Act
of 1968 worked a major revision of federal law. The Gun Control Act was actually
a composite of two statutes. The first of these, adopted as portions of the
Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act, imposed limitations upon imported firearms,
expanded the requirement of dealer licensing to cover anyone "engaged in the
business of dealing" in firearms, whether in interstate or local commerce, and
expanded the recordkeeping obligations for dealers. It also imposed a variety of
direct limitations upon sales of handguns. No transfers were to be permitted
between residents of different states (unless the recipient was a federally
licensed dealer), even where the transfer was by gift rather than sale and even
where the recipient was subject to no state law which could have been evaded.
The category of persons to whom dealers could not sell was expanded to cover
persons convicted of any felony (other than certain business-related felonies
such as antitrust violations), persons subject to a mental commitment order or
finding of mental incompetence, persons who were users of marijuana and other
drugs, and a number of other categories. Another title of the Act defined
persons who were banned from possessing firearms. Paradoxically, these classes
were not identical with the list of classes prohibited from purchasing or
receiving firearms.

The Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act was passed on June 5, 1968, and set to
take effect in December of that year. Barely two weeks after its passage,
Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated while campaigning for the presidency.
Less that a week after his death, the second bill which would form part of the
Gun Control Act of 1968 was introduced in the House. It was reported out of
Judiciary ten days later, out of Rules Committee two weeks after that, and was
on the floor barely a month after its introduction. the second bill worked a
variety of changes upon the original Gun Control Act. Most significantly, it
extended to rifles and shotguns the controls which had been imposed solely on
handguns, extended the class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms to
include those who were users of marijuana and certain other drugs, expanded
judicial review of dealer license revocations by mandating a de novo hearing
once an appeal was taken, and permitted interstate sales of rifles and shotguns
only where the parties resided in contiguous states, both of which had enacted
legislation permitting such sales. Similar legislation was passed by the Senate
and a conference of the Houses produced a bill which was essentially a
modification of the House statute. This became law before the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, and was therefore set for the same effective
date.

Enforcement of the 1968 Act was delegated to the Department of the Treasury,
which had been responsible for enforcing the earlier gun legislation. This
responsibility was in turn given to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the
Internal Revenue Service. This division had traditionally devoted itself to the
pursuit of illegal producers of alcohol; at the time of enactment of the Gun
Control Act, only 8.3 percent of its arrests were for firearms violations.
Following enactment of the Gun Control Act the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division
was retitled the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the IRS. By July,
1972 it had nearly doubled in size and became a complete Treasury bureau under
the name of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

The mid-1970's saw rapid increases in sugar prices, and these in turn drove
the bulk of the "moonshiners" out of business. Over 15,000 illegal distilleries
had been raided in 1956; but by 1976 this had fallen to a mere 609. The BATF
thus began to devote the bulk of its efforts to the area of firearms law
enforcement.

Complaint regarding the techniques used by the Bureau in an effort to
generate firearms cases led to hearings before the Subcommittee on Treasury,
Post Office, and General Appropriations of the Senate Appropriations Committee
in July 1979 and April 1980, and before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Senate Judiciary Committee in October 1980. At these hearings evidence was
received from various citizens who had been charged by BATF, from experts who
had studied the BATF, and from officials of the Bureau itself.

Based upon these hearings, it is apparent that enforcement tactics made
possible by current federal firearms laws are constitutionally, legally, and
practically reprehensible. Although Congress adopted the Gun Control Act with
the primary object of limiting access of felons and high-risk groups to
firearms, the overbreadth of the law has led to neglect of precisely this area
of enforcement. For example the Subcommittee on the Constitution received
correspondence from two members of the Illinois Judiciary, dated in 1980,
indicating that they had been totally unable to persuade BATF to accept cases
against felons who were in possession of firearms including sawed-off shotguns.
The Bureau's own figures demonstrate that in recent years the percentage of its
arrests devoted to felons in possession and persons knowingly selling to them
have dropped from 14 percent down to 10 percent of their firearms cases. To be
sure, genuine criminals are sometimes prosecuted under other sections of the
law. Yet, subsequent to these hearings, BATF stated that 55 percent of its gun
law prosecutions overall involve persons with no record of a felony conviction,
and a third involve citizens with no prior police contact at all.

The Subcommittee received evidence that the BATF has primarily devoted its
firearms enforcement efforts to the apprehension, upon technical malum
prohibitum charges, of individuals who lack all criminal intent and knowledge.
Agents anxious to generate an impressive arrest and gun confiscation quota have
repeatedly enticed gun collectors into making a small number of sales — often as
few as four — from their personal collections. Although each of the sales was
completely legal under state and federal law, the agents then charged the
collector with having "engaged in the business" of dealing in guns without the
required license. Since existing law permits a felony conviction upon these
charges even where the individual has no criminal knowledge or intent numerous
collectors have been ruined by a felony record carrying a potential sentence of
five years in federal prison. Even in cases where the collectors secured
acquittal, or grand juries failed to indict, or prosecutors refused to file
criminal charges, agents of the Bureau have generally confiscated the entire
collection of the potential defendant upon the ground that he intended to use it
in that violation of the law. In several cases, the agents have refused to
return the collection even after acquittal by jury.

The defendant, under existing law is not entitled to an award of attorney's
fees, therefore, should he secure return of his collection, an individual who
has already spent thousands of dollars establishing his innocence of the
criminal charges is required to spend thousands more to civilly prove his
innocence of the same acts, without hope of securing any redress. This of
course, has given the enforcing agency enormous bargaining power in refusing to
return confiscated firearms. Evidence received by the Subcommittee related the
confiscation of a shotgun valued at $7,000. Even the Bureau's own valuations
indicate that the value of firearms confiscated by their agents is over twice
the value which the Bureau has claimed is typical of "street guns" used in
crime. In recent months, the average value has increased rather than decreased,
indicating that the reforms announced by the Bureau have not in fact redirected
their agents away from collector's items and toward guns used in crime.

The Subcommittee on the Constitution has also obtained evidence of a variety
of other misdirected conduct by agents and supervisors of the Bureau. In several
cases, the Bureau has sought conviction for supposed technical violations based
upon policies and interpretations of law which the Bureau had not published in
the Federal Register, as required by 5 U.S.C. Sec 552. For instance, beginning
in 1975, Bureau officials apparently reached a judgment that a dealer who sells
to a legitimate purchaser may nonetheless be subject to prosecution or license
revocation if he knows that that individual intends to transfer the firearm to a
nonresident or other unqualified purchaser. This position was never published in
the Federal Register and is indeed contrary to indications which Bureau
officials had given Congress, that such sales were not in violation of existing
law. Moreover, BATF had informed dealers that an adult purchaser could legally
buy for a minor, barred by his age from purchasing a gun on his own. BATF made
no effort to suggest that this was applicable only where the barrier was one of
age. Rather than informing the dealers of this distinction, Bureau agents set
out to produce mass arrests upon these "straw man" sale charges, sending out
undercover agents to entice dealers into transfers of this type. The first major
use of these charges, in South Carolina in 1975, led to 37 dealers being driven
from business, many convicted on felony charges. When one of the judges informed
Bureau officials that he felt dealers had not been fairly treated and given
information of the policies they were expected to follow, and refused to permit
further prosecutions until they were informed, Bureau officials were careful to
inform only the dealers in that one state and even then complained in internal
memoranda that this was interfering with the creation of the cases. When BATF
was later requested to place a warning to dealers on the front of the Form 4473,
which each dealer executes when a sale is made, it instead chose to place the
warning in fine print upon the back of the form, thus further concealing it from
the dealer's sight.

The Constitution Subcommittee also received evidence that the Bureau has
formulated a requirement, of which dealers were not informed that requires a
dealer to keep official records of sales even from his private collection. BATF
has gone farther than merely failing to publish this requirement. At one point,
even as it was prosecuting a dealer on the charge (admitting that he had no
criminal intent), the Director of the Bureau wrote Senator S. I. Hayakawa to
indicate that there was no such legal requirement and it was completely lawful
for a dealer to sell from his collection without recording it. Since that date,
the Director of the Bureau has stated that that is not the Bureau's position and
that such sales are completely illegal; after making that statement, however, he
was quoted in an interview for a magazine read primarily by licensed firearms
dealers as stating that such sales were in fact legal and permitted by the
Bureau. In these and similar areas, the Bureau has violated not only the
dictates of common sense, but of 5 U.S.C. Sec 552, which was intended to prevent
"secret lawmaking" by administrative bodies.

These practices, amply documented in hearings before this Subcommittee, leave
little doubt that the Bureau has disregarded rights guaranteed by the
constitution and laws of the United States.

It has trampled upon the second amendment by chilling exercise of the right
to keep and bear arms by law-abiding citizens.

It has offended the fourth amendment by unreasonably searching and seizing
private property.

It has ignored the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without just
compensation and by entrapping honest citizens without regard for their right to
due process of law.

The rebuttal presented to the Subcommittee by the Bureau was utterly
unconvincing. Richard Davis, speaking on behalf of the Treasury Department,
asserted vaguely that the Bureau's priorities were aimed at prosecuting willful
violators, particularly felons illegally in possession, and at confiscating only
guns actually likely to be used in crime. He also asserted that the Bureau has
recently made great strides toward achieving these priorities. No documentation
was offered for either of these assertions. In hearings before BATF's
Appropriations Subcommittee, however, expert evidence was submitted establishing
that approximately 75 percent of BATF gun prosecutions were aimed at ordinary
citizens who had neither criminal intent nor knowledge, but were enticed by
agents into unknowing technical violations. (In one case, in fact, the
individual was being prosecuted for an act which the Bureau's acting director
had stated was perfectly lawful.) In those hearings, moreover, BATF conceded
that in fact (1) only 9.8 percent of their firearm arrests were brought on
felons in illicit possession charges; (2) the average value of guns seized was
$116, whereas BATF had claimed that "crime guns" were priced at less than half
that figure; (3) in the months following the announcement of their new
"priorities", the percentage of gun prosecutions aimed at felons had in fact
fallen by a third, and the value of confiscated guns had risen. All this
indicates that the Bureau's vague claims, both of focus upon gun-using criminals
and of recent reforms, are empty words.

In light of this evidence, reform of federal firearm laws is necessary to
protect the most vital rights of American citizens. Such legislation is embodied
in S. 1030. That legislation would require proof of a willful violation as an
element of a federal gun prosecution, forcing enforcing agencies to ignore the
easier technical cases and aim solely at the intentional breaches. It would
restrict confiscation of firearms to those actually used in an offense, and
require their return should the owner be acquitted of the charges. By providing
for award of attorney's fees in confiscation cases, or in other cases if the
judge finds charges were brought without just basis or from improper motives,
this proposal would be largely self-enforcing. S. 1030 would enhance vital
protection of constitutional and civil liberties of those Americans who choose
to exercise their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

[Other sections omitted.]

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Original date: 1999 July 1 — Updated: 2002 May
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